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Abstract. Nowadays, denial of service (DoS) attacks represent a significant frac-
tion of all attacks that take place in the Internet and their intensity is always
growing. The main DoS attack methods consist of flooding their victims with bo-
gus packets, queries or replies, so as to prevent them from fulfilling their roles.
Preventing DoS attacks at network level would be simpler if end-to-end strong
authentication in any packet exchange was mandatory. However, it is also likely
that its mandatory adoption would introduce more harm than benefits.
In this paper we present an end-point addressing scheme and a set of security
procedures which satisfy most of network level DoS prevention requirements. In-
stead of being known by public stable IP addresses, hosts use ephemeral IP Iden-
tifiers cryptographically generated and bound to its usage context. Self-signed
certificates and challenge-based protocols allow, without the need of any third
parties, the implementation of defenses against DoS attacks. Communication in
the open Internet while using these special IP addresses is supported by the so-
called Map/Encap approaches, which in our point of view will be sooner or later
required for the future Internet.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, denial of service (DoS) attacks represent a significant fraction of all attacks
that take place in the Internet [1,18]. Their main goal is to preclude sites and network
infrastructure subsystems from providing service, for economical, political or vandal-
ism goals. DoS as a service can now be purchased from the Internet underground by
some tens of dollars [14] for the smallest attacks. The main DoS attack methods consist
of flooding their victims with bogus packets, queries or replies, so as to prevent them of
fulfilling their roles. Floods with tens of Gbps are quite common [1].
Many attacks are performed at the application level, flooding sites with otherwise
regular service queries. However, those requiring less attack power are infrastructure
level attacks, based on stateless, unauthenticated query/reply protocols, like ICMP,
SNMP, NTP, DNS or SSDP [5]. Most of the deadliest ones use a set of infected ma-
chines under the control of the attacker, known as a botnet, to perform what is called a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack [20]. If the botnet sends IP packets with the
victim’s address as source address to intermediate servers, known as reflectors, the lat-
ter will flood the victim with service replies, effectively hiding the botnet participants.
This is called a Reflection Attack (DRDoS). When the reply has many more bytes than
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the request, the attack may become quite deadly for a relative cheap investment, and is
known as an Amplification Attack.
The main characteristics of the current Internet ecosystem being explored to per-
form DoS attacks are: 1. the absence of mandatory IP address authentication and user
authentication; 2. the absence of both detailed resource accounting and mandatory pre-
vious authorization to send packets to any reachable receiver; 3. system software bugs;
and finally, 4. many service definitions were introduced when all internet users were
“good net citizens”, lacking basic security precautions, and allowing their leveraged to
grow botnets and reflection attacks. On the other hand, by lowering barriers against new
users and providers, these weakness play a pivotal role in the never ending expansion
of the Internet and in lowering its operating costs.
Simple countermeasures against many types of DoS attacks would be possible if
providers prevented their customers from using fake source IP addresses, or imple-
mented context specific analysis of their actions and raised barriers against unusual ac-
tivities (e.g., reverse firewalls). However, providers have no incentive to perform these
actions and some of them could be against the law and the users’ freedom.
Implementing countermeasures in the core of Internet or requiring a close cooper-
ation of most providers is also neither scalable nor very realistic. Thus, most counter-
measures are nowadays implemented near the potential victims, where there is a clear
incentive. Current practices include server replication and bandwidth increase, as well
as resorting to security providers that use expensive and attack-vector dependent detec-
tion techniques, in a never ending “cops and robbers” chase [20].
Even when DoS attacks do not prevent services from being offered, they clearly in-
crease the resources needed to maintain the quality of service thus indirectly increasing
their cost. Additionally, due to the absence of effective measures against these attacks,
network administrators tend to be very conservative, suspect all traffic but the most
trivial one, and block all new protocols. This state of affairs also prevents innovation,
blocks the end-to-end nature of the network and deeply contributes to the so called
ossification of the Internet [3].
Preventing DoS attacks would be simpler if all services could only be implemented
on top of secured and authenticated connections. However, this simplistic approach
would negatively impact the performance of all infrastructure services (e.g., DNS, NTP,
. . . ) and popular TCP-based services, and would introduce, in our opinion, more harm
than benefits related to third party certification management. Security requires diversity
of mechanisms and policies, as well a balanced relation among risks, increased costs
and incentives for adoption. In fact, most infrastructure DoS attacks could be more
easily defended if it was possible to:
– check if the source addresses of IP packets seems consistent or at least sensible;
– easily check with no false negatives nor false positives if a packet is part of an
attack;
– guarantee that some endpoint is at the network location it pretends to be;
– guarantee that transport and application level attacks are more expensive to the
attacker than to the attacked part; and
– prevent parties that do not provide services to the open public from being forced
to use long term, stable, public addresses, belonging to an IP subnet that can be
scanned.
In this paper we present an endpoint addressing scheme and a set of security pro-
cedures we call EIP (Ephemeral IP identifiers cryptographically generated) from now
on, which satisfies most of the above goals. Instead of being known by stable public
IP addresses, hosts use ephemeral IP identifiers cryptographically generated and bound
to their usage context. Self-signed certificates and challenge-based protocols allow the
implementation of the above defense mechanisms without the need of any third parties.
Communication in the open Internet while using these special IP addresses is supported
by the so-called Map/Encap approach [15], which we will present in the next section.
Today, “DDoS as a service” is provided for ridiculously cheap prices when im-
plemented by reflection attacks leveraging connectionless services, or TCP SYN Flood
attacks. This proposal is specially targeted at making these attacks very expensive, mak-
ing them impractical for the average attacker. Thus, the typical attacker is an individual
or an organization capable of, or using a botnet capable of, sending spoofed source IP
packets. Nevertheless, the proposal also helps the combat against transport and applica-
tion level attacks.
We especially do not address the scenario where very powerful organizations, have
enough resources to access the source addresses of arbitrary packets crossing any net-
work. The proposed addressing scheme makes address guessing practically impossible.
The proposal is a mitigation mechanism, not an inexpugnable wall, that tries to balance
risks, costs and incentives.
In Section 3 we present the cryptographic mechanisms and protocols we propose,
and in Section 4 we assess their effectiveness. Next, in Section 5, we discuss the compu-
tational costs of the selected cryptographic algorithms, and show that they are suitable
for the current generation of Internet hosts. Section 6 discusses the related work. The
paper ends with the final conclusions and future work, Section 7.
2 Locator / Identifier Separation
The locator / identifier split solutions, also called Map/Encap solutions, were motivated
by the routing problems brought by mobility and by scalability concerns, e.g., [7,15].
They are characterized by the introduction of two different name spaces: an identifier
namespace, with the same format as IP addresses, independent of the communication
end-points locations; and a locator namespace, i.e., the current IP address space, re-
lated to network location. Communication between parties identified by identifiers takes
place using tunnels ending at locators, by encapsulating IP packets sent between iden-
tifiers in packets sent between locators. This allows the application and transport layers
to communicate by the way of identifiers, free from specific constraints of network
particularities, like location, network service providers’ address space or BGP routing
issues.
Hosts can change locations, interfaces and tunnels, without changing their iden-
tifiers and without disrupting ongoing sessions. Thus, mobility, traffic steering using
multiple communication endpoints, and multi-homing can be dealt with in innovative
new ways. In the rest of the section we will use LISP (Locator / Identifier Separation
Protocol) [15] as an illustration of a Map/Encap approach.
In a LISP-based Internet, each customer network (e.g., an AS or Autonomous Sys-
tem) is assigned an Endpoint Identifier (EID) prefix. These EIDs are only routable in-
side each customers’ network. However, in order for an AS to send packets to another
AS, the packet has to cross the Default Free Zone, where EIDs are not routable. For
this purpose, the border routers on the AS encapsulate packets leaving that AS with the
Routing Locator (RLOC) of the tunnel end. These encapsulated packets will traverse
the Internet until they reach a border router of the intended AS, where the external
header will be removed. Since the identifier in the inner header is routable in this AS,
the original packet is delivered to its destined host (see Figure 1).
Lisp domain (EID 
prefix: 210.0.0.0/24 )
Lisp domain (EID 
prefix: 200.0.0.0/24 )
Mapping System:
EID Prefix: 200.0.0.0/24
locators:
70.0.0.2, priority 1, weight 60
80.0.0.2, priority 1, weight 40
ITR1
ITR2
ETR1
ETR2
Source
(210.0.0.1)
Destination
(200.0.0.1)
DNS System:
www.xyz.com   A   200.0.0.1
70.0.0.2
80.0.0.2
60.0.0.2
210.0.0.1 —> 200.0.0.1210.0.0.1 —> 200.0.0.160.0.0.2 — > 70.0.0.2 250.0.0.1 —> 200.0.0.1100.0.0.5 — > 80.0.0.2 210.0.0.1 —> 200.0.0.1 100.0.0.5LISP EID:250.0.0.5Fig. 1: The LISP Map/Encap solution (ITR - Ingress Tunnel Router, ETR - Egress Tun-
nel Router)
The LISP infrastructure is composed of tunnel routers and the mapping system. The
last implement the EID-to-RLOC mappings, required by the former, using an hierarchy
of mapping servers close to the DNS one.
The above brief presentation follows the initial main motivation of the LISP pro-
posal: to address the scalability issues of the Internet core. However, nothing prevents
an host from acting like the end of the tunnels for its own identifiers, and thus imple-
menting an end-to-end Map/Encap solution. That has been adopted in the so called
LISP Mobile Node proposal [12]. A LISP mobile node is a device using a lightweight
implementation of a LISP domain and acting as a tunnel’s end for its EIDs. The node is
assigned EIDs, which never changes when it changes networks. However, the locators
(RLOCs) attributed are the ones provided by the device’s local network interfaces. The
proposal supports fully end-to-end device and even network (EID prefix) mobility when
the RLOCs are public IP addresses. Support for NAT traversal has also been provided.
LISP adopted solutions for the issues brought by the proposal, which have been
sorted out using test beds [15] in close cooperation with major vendors. It is now avail-
able in routers of some of these vendors and normalized in several RFCs (e.g., see
RFC6830-34)1.
The protocol is flexibly adaptable to different use cases. For example, individual
LISP EIDs can be IPv6 addresses, self-generated, conforming to ORCHID (RFC 7343).
In that case the mapping system can be bypassed if the receiver of an encapsulated
packet trusts the sender EID / RLOC association, and answers directly to the other
extreme of the tunnel. Also, nothing prevents a host from generating a new EID for
each new transport session it needs. These kind of alternate uses are the cornerstones of
our proposal, as will be introduced in the next sections.
3 IP addresses integrity based on self-certified ephemeral EIDs
The EIP proposal introduces forge-resistant identifiers exhibiting integrity proofs in IP
packets, in order to allow the victim to easily discern packets from DRDoS attacks.
Those identifiers are complemented with an optional client puzzle mechanism that con-
firms the sender location before processing its message.
The proposal is based on ephemeral self-certified identifiers, valid for a few minutes
(e.g., tens). It involves an additional security header added to the regular LISP header
containing metadata binding the identifier to its verifiable current usage and location.
Thus, this proposal can be incrementally adopted, and requires no changes to either
applications or transport protocols.
The goal is forcing the endpoint that initiates a transaction (e.g. an NTP client) with
another endpoint (e.g. an NTP server) to generate a specific source identifier, IDsrc, for
that particular transaction. These sender identifiers are IPv6 addresses conforming to
ORCHID, and are generated through cryptographic techniques.
The receiver’s identifier, IDdst (e.g. of the NTP server) should be public (e.g. regis-
tered in DNS) and registered in the mapping system, so that clients are able to obtain
one of its locators, LOCdst , in a trustable way. This registry confers integrity to the iden-
tifier IDdst , since LISP’s mapping system requires authentication of updates. However,
IDdst should also be periodically changed (e.g. once every couple of hours) and its loca-
tors updated in order to improve the robustness of the scheme, since this identifier and
locator will be included in clients’ certificates. The receiver will find the sender’s iden-
tifier and locator in the first received packet, and will only trust them, after executing
the below explained checks.
Since communication is now directed at identifiers instead of IP addresses, there is
now the matter of obtaining and resolving them to locators. For public-facing servers,
the DNS and the LISP Mapping system may be used as explained above. In the other
cases, the initial destination’s identifier and locators should be obtained from trusted
third parties (e.g., by making use of a tracker in a P2P system).
The entities involved in communication have at their disposal one or more pairs
of public/private keys (Pubkey, Privkey), used without restrictions. The certification of
such public keys by third parties is not mandatory, being orthogonal to this proposal.
1 For lack of space, RFCs are only referenced along the paper by their numbers, since they are
easily accessible from the IETF.
It is assumed that the peers’ clocks are synchronized with Universal Time Coordinated
(UTC), with an error smaller than Clockerror.
When a client wishes to communicate with a server with IDdst and LOCdst , it gen-
erates a certificate Certsrc and IDsrc:
Certsrc = (LOCsrc,LOCdst , IDdst ,DurationIDsrc , time,ClientPubkey,Sig)
IDsrc = LSB#bits(HMACk(Certsrc)),where k = H(ClientPubkey)
Sig is a digital signature based on ClientPrivkey over the remaining certificate pa-
rameters. HMACk() is a Hash based Message Authentication Code using the key k. H()
is a secure hash function. LSB#bits() denotes the least significant #bits. Later on we will
present the selected specific cryptographic functions used for implementation purposes.
The identifier IDsrc is generated from the context information in the certificate, which
means it is specific to that transaction, being valid for DurationIDsrc + 2×Clockerror
since the moment time. Nevertheless, the receiver may refuse to accept the certificate if
DurationIDsrc exceeds a threshold value chosen by himself.
The client’s first packet is sent from IDsrc to IDdst through the LISP tunnel estab-
lished between LOCsrc and LOCdst . The certificate Certsrc is transmitted in the security
header. Upon receiving a packet, the receiver makes the following checks:
1. IDdst belongs to its own set of identifiers
2. Certorig is temporally valid (i.e., hasn’t expired and time is not in the future)
3. IDsrc = HMACk(Certsrc)
4. The signature Sig in Certsrc is valid
If the security header is valid and the request is immediately accepted, the reply
follows in a packet from IDdst to IDsrc over the LISP tunnel established between LOCdst
and LOCsrc.
As a result of the described mechanism, the victim of a DRDoS attack is able to
unambiguously identify the packets belonging to the attack, at the cost of comparing
the packets’ identifiers with its own, allowing effective filtering of attack packets. This
identification and filtering may be delegated onto trusted third parties (e.g., providers
edge devices).
However, the reflectors maintain a passive role, checking only the validity of the
new headers, while the victim is still subject to the volumetric aspect of the attack.
Moreover, packets must be processed, even if it simply means discarding them. Ideally,
the reflectors would have a more active role in mitigating attacks.
For this end, we optionally make use of receiver generated challenge puzzles or
RGPs. RGPs are cryptographic puzzles posed by the receiver to the party who initiates
a transaction. Upon receiving a packet from an hitherto unknown party, the receiver
replies with a RGP, requiring its successful resolution before processing the initial re-
quest. The introduction of this mechanism provides two new advantages.
Firstly, if a party truly wishes to have its request processed, it must correctly solve
the challenge posed by the remote party. To do so, the packets’ source location must
be the real one, otherwise the challenge packet won’t be received. As a consequence,
all peers must use their real locators, which makes it impossible to perform reflected
attacks. Although it is possible to use the challenges as an attack vector, it would be
both less effective than current vectors, and easier to detect and mitigate.
Secondly, it allows the receiver to distinguish between hosts who have solved a
challenge (revealing their real location and proving some goodwill). In turn, this allows
the usage of more fine-grained traffic shaping rules (see Section 4), specifically targeting
hosts generating a high volume of unsolved RGPs, which is rather suspicious. The effort
asymmetry in posing vs. solving the puzzle may also provide some degree of protection
against SYN flood attacks, and application layer attacks.
A RGP solution requires a brute-force hash collision computation, inspired by [11]
and [8]. Upon receiving a packet from a non-trusted host, the receiver generates a
pseudo-random number n (which the sender must guess) with 64+ 2l bits, and sends
the receiver a packet with:
– the length l of the secret number n,
– the partial solution n′, which is simply n with the Kbm least significant bits masked,
– the length Kbm of the bit mask,
– the hash h = Hc(c+ IDsrc + IDdst), where “+” denotes concatenation
The client will have to guess, by brute-force, a candidate solution c (of which n′ is
a prefix), such that h = Hc(c+ IDsrc + IDdst). When such a candidate solution is found,
the sender should retransmit the initial request to the receiver, as well as the challenge
and the candidate solution. If the receiver is able to confirm the validity of the candidate
solution, it then processes the request as usual.
To reduce the viability of challenge harvesting, the following precautions are adopted:
– Including IDdst and IDsrc in the hash reduces its scope to those particular hosts
while the identifiers are valid.
– The secret number generator should use a frequently rotated, ephemeral private key,
making it unlikely that the same secret number would work on puzzles posed by
different hosts.
All the above tests can be skipped if the receiver so desires. On one hand, it may
be very lightly loaded. On the other hand, the reply may be shorter then the request so
as to lower any reflection peril. Also, note that the receiver, after the initial handshake,
if it finds the source identifier, IDsrc, of subsequent sender packets, in its own trustable
identifiers whitelist, it will also bypass all checks. The validity of each whitelist entry
is limited by the time-to-live of the respective certificate.
Table 1 summarizes the cryptographic functions selected to implement the EIP
proposal. Note that the cryptographic functions selected offer at least the same secu-
rity guarantees than the current cryptographic suite used by IPSecv3 (RFC6071) and
IKEv2 (RFC7296) as we will discuss in Section 5.
4 Attack mitigation effectiveness
Obtaining attack traces that are simultaneously recent, publicly available, and represen-
tative of complete attacks isn’t an easy task. This is compounded by the fact that at-
tackers may employ different approaches during the attack (such as changing the attack
Table 1: Cryptographic functions selected for EIP implementation
Function Usage Cryptographic algorithms
HMACk() Identifier generation HMAC (RFC2104) using SHA3256−121
i.e., producing 256 bits truncated by using LSB#bits
with #bits = 121 for ORCHID compliance
Sig Certificate digital signature RSA signature using PKCS#1 with 1024 bits key
H(),H()c Identifier and RGP generation SHA3256
vector, focusing on bandwidth vs. packet rate, and rotating the botnet’s live population).
Thus, a simpler model based on the worst case scenario for the defender, i.e., the most
violent points in time of a DRDoS attack, was used to assess EIP effectiveness. That
model will have the attack bandwidth and the amplification factor as parameters.
The attacker can generate attack packets at the average bandwidth or rate Ra bps,
sent by servers hosted by cloud providers, or by bots with a smaller upload capacity. By
hypothesis, without EIP these packets will be accepted by reflectors as genuine. With
EIP they include a certificate and successfully pass the identifier and certificate checks.
Thus, the attacker sends packets of dimension Dreq bits in a traditional or baseline set-
ting, and packets including a certificate of dimension Dreq+cert bits when using EIP. We
assume (on average) small request packets such that Dreq = 100×8= 800 bits including
headers. According to the cryptographic choices in Table 1, Dreq+cert = 450×8 = 3600
bits and the dimension of a puzzle challenge is Dpuz = 272× 8 = 2176 bits. The size
of the reflector answer, if any, is Drep = Dreq×A f if the reflector directly answers the
request with an amplification factor A f , or Dpuz if the reflector resorts to making use of
RGPs.
We will later deduce the flooding bandwidth received by the victim Rv as a function
of Ra. Recall that the victim will easily and surely identify the attack packets as bogus
when using EIP. The following scenarios will be explored:
1. A baseline scenario with no packet filtering techniques;
2. The second scenario introduces the simplest form of the protocol, with identifier
and signature validation, but no client puzzles. All packets sent by the attacker
include valid security headers (otherwise the receiver or any other intermediate
third party could discard the packets as invalid), and all receivers (reflectors) check
the validity of both the identifier and the signature;
3. The third scenario builds on the second scenario: besides verifying the header va-
lidity, the reflectors also resort to making use of RGPs. Since this is a reflection
attack, the source locator in the packets sent by the bots is the victim’s. As a result,
the victim will be flooded by reflectors with RGP packets it did not request.
4. Finally, the fourth scenario builds on the third and introduces a shaper policy in
every reflector. This policy limits the traffic sent by each reflector, thus, the attack
bandwidth is proportional to the number of reflectors. R is the number of reflec-
tors and Rshap the average rate of outstanding RGPs that each reflector accepts per
locator bucket (e.g., a /24 for IPv4 and a /56 for IPv6), the so called peak packet
hit rate allowed by the shapers policy. Lastly, Rv is also computed with R = 103
and Rshap = 10, i.e., 1000 reflectors and each one accepts at most 10 unanswered
puzzles per locator bucket on average. The first parameter seems a good guess, the
second is similar to the shaping parameter used by the RRL (Response Rate Limit)
[19] mechanism of DNS servers.
The attack bandwidth Rv as function of the attacker bandwidth Ra is presented in
table 2 in the different scenarios. The last column of the same table presents results
when Ra = 1 Gbps. In scenario 4, the results are independent of Ra and are only related
to the number of reflectors R and the peak packet hit rate allowed by the shapers policy
Rshap/Dpuz. Figure 2 represents the attack traffic Rv as a function of the packet hit rate
allowed by the shapers policy, when using 1000 reflectors.
Table 2: Attack bandwidth Rv generated by an attack of rate Ra.
Scenario Reflectors Rshap Rv Rv (Ra = 1 Gbps)
Baseline – – Ra/Dreq×Dreq×A f 1 Gbps ×A f
2 – – Ra/Dreq+cert ×Dreq×A f 222 Mbps ×A f
3 – – Ra/Dreq+cert ×Dpuz 604 Mbps
4 1000 10 R×Rshap×Dpuz 12.76 Mbps
Figure 3 represents the cost to the attacker of 1 Gbps of attack traffic in scenario
4, expressed in the number of reflectors required to perform the attack as a function
of the packet hit ratio of the reflectors shapers. For instance, an attack of 12 Gbps
(described as average by several sources [1,18]) would require about 1 million reflectors
with Rshap = 10 packets per second (pps).
Fig. 2: Attack bandwidth as a function
of the peak packet hit rate allowed by
the shapers policy per 1000 reflectors.
Fig. 3: Reflectors required per Gbps of
attack bandwidth, as a function of the
peak packet hit rate allowed by the
shapers policy.
When the protocol is used, both the locator and the identifier of a remote peer are
needed to exchange packets with it, since a host rejects packets addressed to an incorrect
(even if valid) identifier. As a result, an attacker would be unable to obtain new reflectors
to perform a DRDoS attack by simply scanning a range of IP addresses, and would have
to rely more on hosts with public, stable identifiers. With low rate shapers, a successful
attack will require a huge number of reflectors, unlikely to be gathered in due time,
since their identifiers are valid only during a couple of hours.
The protocol is able to effectively mitigate SYN floods when client puzzles are used,
which can be viewed as a generalization of the SYN Cookie mechanism. Additionally,
the client puzzles may also mitigate application-layer DoS attacks, by imposing increas-
ingly harder client puzzles to misbehaving peers. However, some precautions must be
taken against indirect attacks with the purpose of raising the difficulty of client puzzles
for innocent third parties.
The protocol may be progressively adopted since servers may continue to accept
requests directly sent to traditional IP addresses during a transition period. Additionally,
they can also accept requests without security headers sent to their identifiers by the way
of tunnels. In both situations, if servers shape the amount of requests with non verifiable
source address integrity, they may increase the incentive for the adoption of EIP.
The protocol works at the network level, making it independent of the attack vector2.
It introduces a new requirement to successfully exchange packets with other hosts, mak-
ing it harder to harvest commonly available reflectors (e.g., home routers, . . . ), while
simultaneously requiring more reflectors to perform a similarly-sized attack. Candidate
reflectors do not need to always resort to making use of challenge puzzles. For example,
when the protocol at hand is UDP and the reply implies A f < 1 the potential resulting
attack bandwidth is negligible.
The handling of the protocol may also be delegated into trusted third parties, thereby
negating the computational costs to servers. Finally, the client puzzle may be seamlessly
integrated with the TCP handshake, removing the need for additional packet exchange.
The shaper policy plays a large role in the protocol’s effectiveness. However, even a
lax policy like 50 client unanswered outstanding puzzles per second per source locator
bucket, when using 1000 reflectors, brings the attack bandwidth down from 1 Gbps
×A f to 63.8 Mbps, and the attack packet rate down from 12.5 Mpps to 0.05 Mpps — a
reduction of nearly 93.6% (in the absence of amplification!) and 99.6%, respectively.
5 EIP security and computational costs
Security considerations. The EIP cryptographic suite was selected to offer at least the
same security guarantees as provided by the last IPSec related standardization (RFCs
6071, 4302 and 4303).
RFC 6071 presents the IPSecv3 and IKEv2 roadmap and cryptographic updates in
other specific RFCs. HMAC-SHA1-96 (for hash-based macs) and AES-XCBC-MAC
(using AES cryptographic MACs) are standardized alternatives for ESP message in-
tegrity verifications (in the RFC 4308), for two configuration settings for Virtual Private
Networks. These suites are intended to be used in IPSec as single-button choices for al-
ternative VPN configuration purposes. The RFC 4869 (defined by NSA) recommends
2 A few exceptions remain, such as the so-called “quiet attacks” [16], directed at routers.
the use of AES-GMAC and HMAC-SHA functions for ESP integrity control. The RFC
6379 updated the RFC 4869 promoting HMAC-SHA-256-128, and HMAC-SHA-384-
192, specifically for integrity checks in IKEv2 (for IPSec Key-Exchange), as previously
recommended in the RFC 4869 US NSA proposal. Nevertheless, it must be noticeable
that those proposals refer HMACs with hash functions from the SHA-2 family.
In the EIP proposal we decided to evaluate the computational costs of integrity
checks with HMAC-SHA3-256 (using the SHA-3 family or Keccak family) [10], com-
paring with an optional use of AES-GMAC-256 (cryptographic MAC using AES and
a 256 bit key). Although this is not necessarily a notorious security improvement com-
paring to the SHA-2 family (as used in IPSec), our evaluation is aligned with the recent
enforcement from NIST and FIPS-PUB standardization in promoting the recently stan-
dardized SHA-3 Hash-Functions and variants.
Experimental evaluations. For our experimental evaluations we used HMAC-SHA3-
256 and AES-GMAC-256 cryptosuites implemented in the Openssl library v0.98za,
running in a Intel Core i7 2.5GHz QuadCore CPU and MAC-OS X Mavericks v10.9.5.
In this testbench, RSA and DSA integer exponentiation and multiplication are per-
formed by making use of hybrid software and hardware acceleration co-processing. All
running time evaluations were performed by repeating each computation 1,200 times,
in 12 series of 100 trials, performed at different moments. To avoid most noise, dur-
ing tests, other computational tasks in the same computer were avoided. Results series
exhibit a standard deviation of at most 1%.
A candidate attacker, as well as a regular user, will need 470 ms to generate a cer-
tificate (using an already available RSA 1024 bits key pair since these can be prepared
in advance). The defender only needs 37 ms to verify the certificate signature. Recall
that the attacker needs IDdst to produce the certificate and this is only valid for a couple
of hours. Making use of the HMAC function to compute IDsrc requires 13.98 µs, and
13.81 µs to verify, almost the same time.
In our practical observations we repeated all the above tests using AES-GMAC-256
(using a 256 bit key), as a possible alternative for HMAC-SHA3-256, exactly the same
integrity proof standardized for IPSec in RFC 6071 and ESP in RFC-6379. The impact
of using this cryptosuite is to slow (in average by a factor of 2,72) the computational
costs, comparing with HMAC-SHA3-256. Then, in the same experimental settings the
computation of IDsrc requires 53,26 µs and 52,06 µs to verify, a balanced time for gen-
eration and verification. This includes the key generation from an initial seed and the
CMAC computation itself.
Resistance against IDsrc forging. To be successful in a reflection attack with vio-
lation of the integrity of the identifiers, an attacker should be able to produce a collision
with IDsrc (which is only valid during a couple of hours) using a “valid certificate”.
Again, the best scenario for the attacker is when the receiver only verifies that time is
valid and IDsrc = HMACk(Certsrc) without verifying the signature.
For this to happen, the attacker needs to violate in the best effort the property of
second-image resistance of the SHA-3 function implicit to the HMAC computation.
Since there are no publicly known cryptographic vulnerabilities of the SHA-3 function
“sponge” and the synthesis primitive Keccak embedded in SHA3 [9] the attacker needs
to generate 2128 (≈ 3,4×1038) identifiers, requiring 1.32×1030 hours in a single pro-
cessor like the one used in tests, and 1.32×1010 hours (around one million years) when
using 1020 (1000 billion) computers, to perform an operation whose usefulness lasts for
a couple of hours. One may note that only the least 121 bits of the HMAC are required,
and not all the 256 bits of the output. Any way, the probability of occurring a collision
of the least significant 121 in 256 bits pseudo randomly generated is ≈ 10−32. This
value may be computed using formula 1− e−(N×(N−1))/2K , with N trials and K=121
(bits) according to appendix 1 of [17].
By making use of AES-GMAC-256, the attacker must invest in generating 2256 dif-
ferent identifiers (by brute-forcing all possible AES keys generated from the unknown
seed), or 9.95 ∗ 1070 hours using a single processor or around 9,95 ∗ 1050 hours using
1000 billion computers. The other way is to compute the identifier using some form of
cryptanalysis against AES (by breaking the AES computation and the 256 bit key) by
plaintext/cyphertext combinations, a not feasible attack in the time to live of valid IDdst
identifiers.
RGP solving. In order to solve the RGP sent by the receiver in the challenge mes-
sage, the initial sender of the first packet needs to find by brute force the integer c from
which it already knows all bits except Kbm, the length of the bit mask of the puzzle,
such that H = SHA3256(c+ IDorig + IDdst) is the result of the challenge.
In the same hardware, the verification of the solution by the challenger is the cost
of a comparison if it stores all the challenges sent recently, or the cost of computing
an HMAC if not, i.e., 13.81 µs to verify. The solution of the puzzle requires on average
2Kbm/2 trials according to the birthday collision paradox. In the same setting, with Kbm =
20 it takes approximately 13 ms.
For the case of AES-GMAC-256, the sender of the first packet needs now to find
c from which it already knows all bits except Kbm, the length of the puzzle, such that
H = AES−GMAC−256(c+ IDorig + IDdst) is the correct result for the challenge. The
verification of the solution by the challenger is the comparison cost of storing all the
challenges sent recently, or the cost of computing on-the-fly the AES-GMAC-256, i.e.,
only 51.51 µs to verify. Comparing with the HMAC-SHA3-256 option, the cost is a
little bit higher for the defender, but even more unbalanced in the effort required to the
attacker.
In conclusion, we emphasize that our experimental observations above are the best
choices reflecting the best case scenario for attackers intending to send incorrect iden-
tifiers, with no significant cost for an honest receiver.
6 Related work
DoS combat effectiveness can not be tackled by “black-and-white” arguments. On one
hand, several possible measures are not realistic since they increase the discomfort
of users and quickly become incentives to circumvent them, what turns upside down
their initial goal. On the other hand, approaches must be balanced against investments
and operational costs increase, complexity increment, as well as architectural decisions
leading to diminishing scalability returns. Moreover, and above all, incentives play a
pivotal role in DoS combat assessment. Many proposals increase costs where there are
no incentives to implement them and are therefore doomed to fail.
Defensive walls against DoS can be implemented near the attackers and reflectors,
near the victims or in the core of the Internet [20]. One of the easiest ways to lower DoS
impact would be to prevent ISP (Internet Service Providers) customers from making use
of IP source address spoofing, as is recommended in BCP 38 (“Best Current Practices”)
[4] since 2000. However, by lack of incentives, this practice is today far from being
generalized.
Easier to implement are measures preventing critical public infrastructure servers
from being used as reflectors. For example, most publicly available DNS servers make
use of request dampening and filtering (e.g., Response Rate Limit - RRL [19]) tech-
niques to prevent their usage as DDoS reflectors. However, the available methods are
all protocol dependent and are based on heuristics inspired from the current attack prac-
tices, which may be circumvented by more sophisticated attackers [13]. Proposals that
increase the complexity and costs of the core ([20]) are also not very realistic since the
core is where scalability plays a paramount role. Moreover, transit operators lack the
incentives to implement them.
This leaves defensive walls near the victims as the most realistic. These walls are
today of two types: firstly, capacity and diversity increase and, secondly, inbound traffic
filtering or shaping. Capacity increase is an expensive and never ending type of mea-
sure whose effectiveness against amplification attacks is arguable. Diversity can be im-
plemented by making use of cloud or CDN (Content Distributed Networks) providers
that require attackers to spread their forces and targets. Additionally, many of these
providers offer DoS oriented filtering and forensic services invoiced as an extra. Ironi-
cally, it has been observed that most publicly contractable booter services are protected
from the attacks of other booters by these types of services [14].
We now turn to the more directly related work analysis. Mandatory IPSec adoption
would make users dependent of third parties for certificate authentication and would
increase user costs. Moreover, it would increase the potential for security guaranties
concentration in a, necesserely small, number of certificate issuing operators responsi-
ble for security at all layers: application, transport (e.g., TLS) and application. Finally,
it would increase behind acceptable limits the latency of all short-term interactions. Our
proposal is also a network layer one. However, by relying on a locator / identifier sep-
aration proposal (Map/Encap) using ephemeral self-certified identifiers and ephemeral
self-certified association between identifiers and locations, it aims at avoiding the com-
plexities of certificate management and overhead increase issues.
All Map/Encap proposals implement the authenticity of the association between
(prefix) identifiers and their locators. LISP, as well as other proposals (e.g., [6]), dele-
gate this pivotal security role to the mapping system, which becomes a central security
component. This centralization is compatible with today’s AS and ISP ecosystem, but
may become a nightmare against competition and privacy in a Internet dominated by
mobility and roaming individuals, receiving simultaneous service from several differ-
ent providers (e.g., cellular, WiFi, . . . ). Moreover, all locators updates can only take
place by using the mapping system as a mediating party, which is an additional factor
of latency increase during mobility events, or the activation of new interfaces.
With EIP, only public servers are required to have their locators published in the
mapping system, since it introduces a new end-to-end mechanism supporting the verifi-
cation of the authenticity of the relationship between identifiers and locators. For exam-
ple, after the initial verifications and challenges, both communication parties can use a
lighter security protocol to update their locations, without depending of third parties. In
situations of low “criticality level”, the answer to an isolated query can be directly sent
to the locator that originated it.
Paper [6] also proposes a Map/Encap-based solution and claims its effectiveness in
DDoS prevention and detection. However, this solution leverages the mapping system
for all packet exchanges among hosts, is restricted to tunnels ending in network oper-
ators equipment, is not end-to-end, restricts a host to operators that can authenticate it,
and only works if both end-tunnel operators can authenticate each other.
Response Rate Limiting (RRL) [19] is an application layer approach specific to
the DNS protocol. Its effectiveness is also dependent of the way DNS clients currently
perform queries and would fail if attackers become more sophisticated [13].
Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [7] is an end-to-end protocol that makes use of hashed
public keys as host identifiers. By using IPSec, HIP allows two mobile hosts to es-
tablish a secure and authenticated tunnel among them. It is heavier and requires more
packet exchanges than our proposal since it achieves a higher security level similar to
IPSec tunnels or TLS connections. To combat DoS, HIP also uses puzzles during the
handshake.
Our proposal goes in the same vein as weak authentication [2] and besides the in-
stallation of a new software module in the system kernel, it requires no further action
from the user, since it does not aim at solving all the security problems, but only intro-
duces a light layer of identifier and location integrity, without precluding the adoption
of any other complementary and higher level security measures.
Additionally, this small layer of address integrity and locality ascertainably and ver-
ification can be delegated by public-facing servers in third party front ends (e.g., cloud
operators), without reducing server security or requiring the delegation of their identity
and authentication keys or certificates. In this environment, only clients would be forced
to directly support an increased overhead. This contributes to put the incentives in the
right place.
7 Conclusions and future work
Nowadays DoS attacks represent a significant fraction of all attacks that take place in
the Internet, leading to significant economic losses by comparison with attackers small
investments.
Due to its root causes, this state of affairs can not be changed overnight. Currently,
most successful combat measures include servers replication and servers bandwidth
increase, as well as resorting to security providers that use expensive and attack-vector
dependent detection techniques in a never ending “cops and robbers” chase.
In this article we propose EIP, an approach based on the use of forge-resistant, self-
certified, ephemeral identifiers as source addresses, in order to allow a victim to easily
discern packets from a reflected attack. Those identifiers are optionally complemented
with a client puzzle mechanism that also confirms a client’s location before processing
their request. The protocol involves an additional security header added to the recently
proposed Map/Encap approaches (e.g., LISP), containing context metadata. Thus, it can
be incrementally adopted, and requires no changes to either applications or transport
protocols. One main characteristic of the proposal is that it allows a fine adjustment
of the level of precautions taken by the defenders, thus introducing adaptability to the
context, a feature often absent in other security mechanisms. Finally, it works at the
network level, making it independent of the attack vector.
EIP introduces a new requirement to successfully exchange packets with other
hosts, making it harder to harvest commonly available reflectors (e.g., home routers,
. . . ), while simultaneously requiring more reflectors to perform a similarly-sized attack.
Candidate reflectors do not need to always resort to making use of challenge puzzles.
For example, when the protocol at hand is UDP and the reply implies a contraction of
the query volume, the potential resulting attack bandwidth is negligible. However, if the
communication parties need to engage in a longer interaction (e.g., a TCP connection),
EIP the TCP handshake, preventing SYN Flood attacks and making use of RGPs to
adjust the client’s computational effort to the current server context.
The proposal motto is to perceive security measures as a continuous set of mecha-
nisms and policies, from cheap and simple, to expensive and complex, so as to balance
risks, costs and incentives to attain real effectiveness. Moreover, this proposal does not
precludes the possible complementary use of other mechanisms, namely those at the
transport and application layers.
The simple worst-case analysis presented shows that the proposed mechanisms are
able to drastically reduce the power of the most deadly popular attacks, thus fulfilling
the claimed properties. Future work includes an evaluation and refinement of EIP based
on a more multifaceted and deeper analysis. It will also embrace a comprehensive study
of EIP implementation issues and adoption incentives.
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